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Good Friendships among Children: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation 
 
DAVID WALKER, RANDALL CURREN AND CHANTEL JONES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Ethical dimensions of friendship have rarely been explicitly addressed as aspects of friendship 
quality in studies of children’s peer relationships.  This study identifies aspects of moral virtue 
significant for friendship, as a basis for empirically investigating the role of ethical qualities in 
children’s friendship assessments and aspirations.  We introduce a eudaimonic conception of 
friendship quality, identify aspects of moral virtue foundational to such quality, review and contest 
some grounds on which children have been regarded as not mature enough to have friendships 
that require virtue, and report a qualitative study of the friendship assessments and aspirations of 
children aged nine and ten (n = 83). In focus group sessions conducted in ten schools across Great 
Britain, moral qualities figured prominently in children’s assessments of friendship quality.  The 
findings provide evidence of children having friendships exhibiting mutual respect, support, and 
valuing of each other’s good character.    
 
Keywords:  friendship, children, friendship quality, eudaimonic well-being, SDT, moral 
development 
 
I. FRIENDSHIP QUALITY 
 
Quality of friendship and the social competence that contributes to friendship quality are widely 
regarded as important to children’s wellbeing and adjustment (see e.g., Adams, Santo and 
Bukowski, 2011; Berndt, 2002; Eisenberg, Vaughan and Hofer, 2009; Ladd, 2005; Ladd, 
Kochenderfer and Coleman, 1996).   
 
“Quality” is typically characterized in non-moral terms, as pertaining to “level” or “degree” of 
emotional support, absence of conflict, enjoyment of companionship, and the like.  “Social 
competence” is similarly characterized in non-moral terms, despite a broadening of this term to 
include not just specific social skills but often “prosocial” and cooperative orientations or 
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temperament (Crick, Murray-Close, Marks and Mohajeri-Nelson, 2009; Eisenberg et al., 2009; 
Ladd, 1999, 2005, p. 193 & 318).   
 
Prosocial orientation and cooperative temperament are constructs that strive for value neutrality, 
and such neutrality has long been considered essential to scientific objectivity, but there are 
grounds for contesting this assumption (see Kristjánsson, 2013) and addressing the ethical 
dimensions of friendship quality and social competence as objects of investigation.  If, for 
example, fairness is a virtue preferred in friends, it scarcely furthers our understanding of 
friendship to exclude it from consideration.   
 
We introduce a eudaimonic conception of friendship quality as a basis for investigating ethical 
aspects of children’s friendship quality assessments and aspirations.  
 
Children’s Friendships 
 
Observational and interview studies have recently suggested that children are concerned with the 
ethical attributes of peer friends, grasp ethically salient implicit rules of peer relationships (help, 
share, be honest, etc.), and can begin to display moral sensitivity and responsiveness toward peer 
friends by ages 4 to 6 years (Bigelow, Tesson and Lewko, 1996; Dunn, 2006).  Peer friendship is 
also by many accounts foundational to moral development, as an arena of voluntary association 
with social equals beyond the family (Akerman, Kenrick and Schaller, 2007; Bell & Coleman, 1999; 
Bukowski, Motzoi and Meyer, 2009; Bukowski & Sippola, 1996, 2005; Dunn, 2006; Keller, 1984; 
Piaget, 1932/1965) and a sphere of trust, disclosure, morally reflective conversation, and mutual 
formation (Aristotle, 1999; Brewer, 2005; Cocking & Kennett, 1998; Sherman, 1989; Wadell, 1989), 
suggesting a developmental interdependence of friendship and virtue.  These studies go some 
ways toward overcoming a tradition of thought suggesting that children do not possess or value in 
their peers the ethical attributes significant for friendship quality (Aristotle, 1999; Kohlberg, 1984; 
Selman, 1980)1, but there has been little direct theoretical or empirical investigation of the matter.   
  
The Present Inquiry 
 
This study will contest the more pessimistic views of children’s character and friendships, and offer 
findings from our own qualitative research that reinforce previous studies suggesting that at least 
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some pre-adolescent children value and exhibit virtues of character important to friendship 
quality.  We will introduce a eudaimonic conception of friendship quality and identify aspects of 
moral virtue foundational to such quality.  We will then acknowledge some grounds on which it 
has been supposed that pre-adolescent children are not capable of kinds of friendship that require 
the possession of virtue, and suggest a variety of grounds for hypothesizing that at least some 
children are capable of having such friendships with their peers.  These preliminaries will provide 
the theoretical basis for the study of pre-adolescent children we will then report and discuss.   
We interpret the data we will present in Section 4 as evidence that by age ten some 
children will have: (1) learned – perhaps largely through their experience of friendship – that a 
variety of moral virtues are desirable in friends, and (2) adopted aspirations to exhibit those 
virtues of friendship themselves.  The limitations of this study do not enable us to estimate the 
extent to which these aspirations are reflected in the acquisition and consistent expression of 
those virtues, but we interpret the data as indicating the possession of moral motivation focused 
on the well-being of others, as well as motivation to engage in activities of friendship that would 
be consistent with and develop the relevant virtues. 
 
II. THE NATURE, EUDAIMONIC QUALITY, AND VIRTUES OF FRIENDSHIP 
 
The Nature of Friendship 
 
Friendship has been defined by philosophers as a form of relationship that is: based in the mutual 
positive regard two people have for one another, exhibits mutual concern and willingness to act 
for the good of the other for the other’s sake, and involves time spent together in shared activities 
(Helm, 2013).  As implied by the Greek word for friendship, philia (a form of love), the mutual 
positive regard involved in friendship is often characterized as affectionate or imbued with friendly 
feeling, and it is assumed or expressly affirmed that the pleasure or enjoyment of shared activities 
is in some measure an enjoyment of the friend herself or her perceived qualities.  It is also often 
noted explicitly that the positive regard and goodwill essential to friendship are not just mutual, 
but mutually recognized and acknowledged.  To say that friendship is a form of relationship based 
in mutual positive regard is to imply that liking each other or appreciating each other’s perceived 
qualities is an essential aspect of friendship.  This philosophical definition seems well aligned with 
common intuitions about who is, and is not, a friend.   
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 A commonly used psychological definition of friendship identifies it as a form of “voluntary 
interdependence between two persons over time, that is intended to facilitate social-emotional 
goals of the participants, and may involve varying types and degrees of companionship, intimacy, 
affection, and mutual assistance” (Asher & McDonald, 2010; cf. Berndt & McCandless, 2009; Hays, 
1988).  This definition does not expressly identify mutual positive regard and goodwill as necessary 
conditions for friendship, and it seems to depart very significantly from the philosophical 
definition in these respects.  Yet, the overview of psychological research on which the definition is 
based identifies mutual liking (positive regard) as an “essential condition for friendship formation” 
(Hays, 1988, p. 397) and it identifies positive affect (enjoyment associated with positive regard) as 
“necessary to hold a friendship together” (p. 394). Enjoyment of each other’s company and 
“mutual aid” are also mentioned as key properties or expectations of friendship (pp. 393 & 395). 
The mutual aid that is characteristic of friendship and valued by friends is presumably rooted in 
liking and caring about each other, rather than extrinsic motivations (known in some contexts as 
“ulterior motives”).  Returning to the philosophical definition, it seems to capture by implication 
most or all of the inherent benefits or “provisions” of friendship noted in the psychological 
definition: the validation of one’s worth entailed by a friend’s positive regard for oneself as a 
person, the security of mattering to someone who is concerned for one’s well-being, the 
companionship implied by time spent together in shared activities, and the intimacy made 
possible by time spent together and by the trust and mutual liking implied by mutual validation 
and concern.   
The differences between these definitions may, in short, be largely reconciled by 
consulting the wider body of psychological research on which the psychological definition is said to 
be based.  Although other attempts to define friendship might be considered, the reconciliation of 
these philosophical and psychological definitions justifies the conclusion that mutual positive 
regard and mutual concern and willingness to act for the good of the other for the other’s sake are 
essential features of friendship.   
 
A Eudaimonic Conception of Wellbeing and Friendship Quality 
 
These defining features of friendship imply that friends must possess certain attributes.  They 
must be capable of feeling and exhibiting positive regard for other persons based on appreciation 
of perceived qualities.  And they must be capable of concern for another’s wellbeing and be willing 
to act for the good of the other.  These are broadly moral attributes and would qualify as moral 
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virtues if they are informed by an accurate perception and understanding of the other person’s 
qualities and wellbeing, and are reliably exhibited in conduct.  The question we will address is 
whether virtues of character are important to friendship quality.  The remainder of this section 
and the next will consider this question from a theoretical standpoint, laying groundwork for the 
empirical investigation reported and discussed in sections four and five.  We will suggest a 
eudaimonistic framework grounded in Self-Determination Theory (SDT), which has demonstrable 
explanatory value with respect to adult friendship (Deci, La Guardia, Moller, Scheiner and Ryan, 
2006; Demir & Davidson, 2012; Demir & Özdemir, 2010; La Guardia & Patrick, 2008), and well-
established applicability across the life span (Deci & Ryan, 2012).   
The term, “eudaimonia,” signifies “living well” or “living a good life,” and friendship is by all 
accounts essential to living a good life (see, e.g., Argyle, 2001; Aristotle, 1999, pp. 119-120; Demir, 
Orthel and Andelin, 2013; Demir & Özdemir, 2010; Helm, 2013; Holder & Coleman, 2009; Pahl, 
2000).  One well-established reason for regarding friendship as essential to a good life is that it is 
important to subjective well-being.  Subjectively, it provides the most complete satisfaction of the 
psychological need for relatedness (experiencing mutual acceptance and affirmation), and 
contributes to the satisfaction of needs for competence and autonomy (Demir & Davidson, 2012; 
Demir & Özdemir, 2010; La Guardia & Patrick, 2008), the satisfaction of all three of these needs 
being theorized and empirically confirmed to be essential to happiness (Deci & Ryan, 2012; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000).  Affirming the value of others enhances one’s own well-being even when it is not 
reciprocated (Deci et al., 2006), and being a non-reciprocating recipient of such affirmation 
typically yields related benefits; friendship involves reciprocal affirmation of worth, combining the 
benefits of both giving and receiving affirmation.  The eudaimonistic perspective holds that 
friendship through which human social potential is fulfilled well or virtuously also contributes to a 
life being lived admirably.  The eudaimonistic framework we adopt posits that when people aspire 
to live well or live good lives, they have in mind lives that involve admirable and satisfying 
fulfilments of human potential (Aristotle, 1999; Curren, 2013; Ryan, Curren, and Deci, 2013).  
Human social potential is fulfilled admirably in affirmations of the value of others and promotion 
of their good or flourishing.  
Eudaimonic friendship, or friendship that is high in eudaimonic quality, would accurately 
perceive and appreciate a friend’s qualities, and, in acting for the friend’s good for her own sake, 
would understand her good in eudaimonic terms.  Friendships high in eudaimonic quality would 
be rich in intrinsically rewarding activities and exhibit mutual support of self-determination, 
personal growth, wider relational fulfillment, and success in worthy endeavors. Such friendships 
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contribute to the satisfaction of the friends’ basic psychological needs, and could not do so 
without the friends exhibiting forms of basic moral respect entailed by respecting each other as 
self-determining rational beings.  Eudaimonism posits that eudaimonistic friendship is good for 
people, and we hypothesize that it aligns with and explains judgments about who is and is not a 
“good” friend. 
  
Virtues of Eudaimonic Friendship 
 
The forms or aspects of moral virtue required for eudaimonic friendship can be specified as 
follows:  
(1) Eudaimonic friendship requires basic moral respect for others as self-determining 
persons, so a disposition to show such respect towards other persons is required.  Basic moral 
respect of this kind is inherent in the idea of moral virtue, and understood to entail norms of non-
coercion, honesty, fairness, and avoidance of emotional manipulation that undermines rational 
judgment.  It is a foundational form of respect for what is good because it is good, the good in 
question being the potential for rational self-determination that is more or less fulfilled in all 
human beings.  Eudaimonic friends don’t coerce, deceive, cheat, manipulate, seduce, or try to 
corrupt each other. 
(2) Eudaimonic friendship involves appreciative regard for a friend because he or she is 
actually good, and such regard is only possible for someone who is able to discern who is good in 
specific ways and who is not.  Discernment of this kind is an aspect of being virtuous, and it is 
dependent to some extent on the possession of virtuous desires, emotions, aspirations, and 
understanding.  Eudaimonic friends see what is good in us and appreciate us for who we are. 
 (3) The third aspect of virtue required for eudaimonic friendship is willingness to act for 
the good of another for the other’s sake.  Such willingness goes beyond what is required by basic 
moral respect, and is in that sense morally “supererogatory” or a reflection of a special form of 
commitment or devotion that is part of friendship.  What the qualification, “for the other’s sake,” 
signifies is that the acts exhibiting devotion to a friend spring from a desire to promote the other’s 
well-being.  Examples would be actions intended to help a friend through difficulty, satisfy a need, 
or enable the friend to grow, learn something new, or achieve an end that is important to her and 
not unworthy of her.  Terms that would come to mind in describing the qualities exhibited in such 
examples are “caring,” “generous,” and “supportive.” 
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III. CAN CHILDREN HAVE EUDAIMONIC FRIENDSHIPS? 
 
Grounds for Pessimism 
 
Pessimism about the quality of children’s friendships goes back at least to Aristotle, who 
developed a typology of kinds of friendship that remains a frequent point of reference for 
philosophers (Aristotle, 1999).  He argues that the best and most complete form of friendship is 
based on friends’ mutual appreciation of each other’s good character, and that the friendships of 
young people appear to be based on pleasure, since their actions are dictated by what presents 
itself as most pleasant at any given time.2  His view is essentially that children are not yet morally 
responsible agents, in whom settled states of character and deliberative reasoning yield choices, 
and that becoming such agents occurs primarily through a lengthy process of guided practice or 
“habituation” (Aristotle, 1999, pp. 18-36; Burnyeat, 1980; Curren, 2000, pp. 162-164; Curzer, 2002; 
Sherman, 1989).  This view of children has persisted, and it derives some credence from the 
prominent role that Aristotelian ideas have played in the ongoing renaissance of virtue and 
happiness studies (Annas, 2011; Curren, 2015a; Kristjánsson, 2007).  It is a view that is in some 
respects testable, however, and it is safe to assume that some of the testable hypotheses in 
Aristotle’s ethical system will be refuted by the evidence, just as others may be well supported 
(Ryan et al., 2013). 
Another basis for doubting that children are capable of eudaimonic friendship is the dated 
body of theories of the stages through which childhood friendships develop, the best known of 
which are those of H. S. Sullivan, Brian Bigelow, William Damon, and R. L.  Selman (Bigelow, 1977; 
Damon, 1977; Damon, 1983; Selman, 1980; Sullivan, 1953).  To the extent that these theories 
focus on cognition and are modelled on cognitive stage theories, it would be reasonable to expect 
a pessimistic estimation of children’s prospects for high quality peer friendships.  As we noted in 
passing above, the Kohlbergian model would imply that in the sphere of moral development pre-
adolescent children are, at best, committed to upholding conventions.  This would predict, as 
Selman’s model does, that displays of reciprocity in children’s peer friendships would be inflexible 
and motivationally unrelated to the friend’s well-being (Selman, 1980).  Among these and other 
researchers, there is also general agreement that adolescence is a time of growth in the ability to 
grasp another person’s perspective, and thus a time when friendships become more intimate and 
characterized by mutual understanding (Dunn, 2006; Selman, 1980; Youniss, 1980).  The role of 
perspective taking is undoubtedly an important aspect of moral development (Batson et al., 2003), 
 8  
 
sensitivity to other’s interests, and the intimacy of friendships, and it is sometimes inferred from 
this that friendships dependent on virtues would not typically appear until late adolescence 
(Healy, 2011, p. 447).  By this logic, even Damon’s work on childhood friendship may be perceived 
as unfavourable to preadolescent children having eudaimonic friendships.  Our own assessment is 
that limitations of perspective-taking ability, intimacy, and degree of understanding of the other’s 
perspective would not obviously disqualify a relationship from being a eudaimonic friendship, 
their significance for friendship notwithstanding.  To the extent that these developmental models 
were cognitive and based on interview data, their identification of adolescence as the period in 
which true friendship emerges may also reflect a mistaken assumption that social competence 
cannot precede the capacity to verbalize friendship preferences and aspirations.3  
 
Grounds for Optimism 
 
Neither the Aristotelian considerations nor the stage theories of friendship speak with one voice 
or convincingly against the possibility of children having eudaimonic friendships. 
The aspects of Aristotle’s thought that remain viable starting points for contemporary 
investigations do not rule out the possibility of children having eudaimonic friendships.  First, he 
notes that there are natural differences of virtue, some children being substantially more 
cooperative and reasonable than others (Aristotle, 1999), and that the young are generally more 
prone to trust and seeing the best in people (Aristotle, 1984, p. 2213).  If children can indeed 
possess such natural virtue, then some pre-adolescents might be virtuous enough to have 
eudaimonic peer-friendships, without much moral habituation.  Second, there is an implicit 
distinction in Aristotle’s ethics between passive habituation (by immersion in a socially healthy 
world) and active habituation (through guided practice) (Curren, 2015a), and the fact that the 
former could begin earlier than the latter suggests there might be time to acquire the virtues 
required for friendship during childhood.  Third, there are grounds for optimistic readings of the 
nature and timing of active habituation (Annas, 2011; Curren, 2014; cf. Curzer, 2002; Sherman, 
1989).  Specifically, if the most plausible understanding of what habituation could be is that it is 
infused with reason-giving from the beginning, and encourages an appreciation of what is good 
and an aspiration to be good, then we are not forced to envision an appreciative responsiveness to 
the goodness of people as a distant trailing effect of moral development.  Responsiveness of this 
kind would entail all of the aspects of virtue we have identified as essential to eudaimonic 
friendship. 
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Fourth, and most intriguing, is the possibility that children’s autonomous engagement in 
the activities of friendship might constitute a form of habituation along the lines just noted.  Most 
children have friends from a very early age, and the centrality of friendship in their lives would 
normally ensure steady and extensive “practice” in the activities of friendship, unless their lives 
are systematically controlled by adults.  Habituation of this kind would have three distinctive 
features: (1) a child learning to be a good friend would be coached by peer-friends, who admonish 
and advise on the basis of their own developing understanding of how friends should treat each 
other; (2) the importance of the friends and friendships to the child may be an unusually direct 
source of aspiration to self-improvement (Dunn, 2006, pp. 5-7, 38-40, 42-44); (3) the forms of 
goodness or virtue required of friends seem to have a natural basis that makes them identifiable 
(if not necessarily nameable) to children in the course of their experience with friendship.4  In 
favourable circumstances, pre-adolescent children’s developing attempts at friendship might be 
productively shaped by an ability to compare their own experiences of what is good and bad in 
friends with the expectations of peer-associates who offer criticism and encouragement.5  
Evidence that children’s selection of friends is sensitive to virtues of character would support this 
supposition that peer coached practice in the activities of friendship might be an efficient mode of 
character development, since children drawn to others on this basis would be reasonably well 
placed to receive helpful moral coaching. 
Returning to the stage theories of friendship, there are significant differences between 
them regarding the apparent bases of children’s friendships, their expectations of friends, and 
their responsiveness to friends’ well-being.  Bigelow’s and Damon’s models both suggest that 
appreciation of a friend’s moral qualities is a significant aspect of pre-adolescent peer friendships, 
with Damon identifying trust, reliability, and personal qualities as all significant by ages 8 to 10 
(Bigelow, 1977; Damon, 1977).  Sullivan’s model holds that children aged 8 to 11 years old are 
already learning how to help each other grow as persons in their peer friendships, suggesting an 
orientation to affirming each other’s value and promoting each other’s good for unselfish reasons 
(Sullivan, 1953).  The contrast between these developmental theories of children’s friendships and 
Selman’s model, noted above, is in any case oblique, given the differences between their various 
conceptualizations of the nature of the stages involved.  All told, these theories are far from 
decisive regarding the possibility of children having eudaimonic friendships with peers, suggesting 
that further research is needed. 
 
IV. THE STUDY 
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Rationale  
 
Although the research on friendship relations between children is vast, varied and promising, 
there is much that can still be learned from investigations of children’s experiences of friendships.  
In particular, the ethical dimensions of preadolescent children’s friendships and their 
understanding of virtues of character in the context of these relationships are underexplored. 
Having specified the virtues foundational to eudaimonic friendship (in section 2) and found the 
existing research literature inconclusive regarding the capacity of pre-adolescent children to form 
such friendships (in section 3), the present study focuses on children’s awareness and possession 
of attributes of virtue as aspects of friendship quality.   
 
Methods 
 
As part of a broader investigation of character and character education in schools across the 
United Kingdom, 14 focus-group interviews with children aged nine and ten (n = 83) in 10 schools 
were conducted.  These schools were selected to include different types and cover different 
regions of the UK (Table 1).  Focus groups were carried out between March and October 2013.6  
The initial purpose of the focus groups was to investigate children’s use of moral language, 
“friends” being one of the categories used to prompt discussion of the qualities they admired or 
expected in people (other categories included “teachers”, “famous people”, and “family 
members”).  Six children were recruited for each focus group session, on the basis of parental 
consent and through requests that teachers provide samples of students representative of their 
schools with regard to ability, behaviour, attainment, gender, and race.  
At the start of focus group sessions the participants were told that there were no right or 
wrong answers, that they were not being tested, and that the researchers present were interested 
to know their views in order to learn how schools might help children be good people as well as 
good students.  In each group children were asked to write down the word “friend” and then what 
they thought made a good friend.  Once completed, researchers facilitated the pupils’ discussion 
of their ideas, before covering the other themes, with sessions lasting between 40 and 60 minutes.     
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Table 1 – List of participating schools and pupil codes 
Focus 
Group 
Code 
School 
code 
Information about school 
% of pupils eligible 
for Free School 
Meals  
in school 
Total 
pupils 
KeyStage1/  
KeyStage2 
Members (and pupil codes) Unidentifiable 
FG1 
P5 
Academy 
Non-faith 
Birmingham 
51 820 
G1 FG1 G2 FG1 G3 FG1 B1 FG1 B2 FG1 B3 FG1 G FG1/B FG1 
FG2 G1 FG2 G2 FG2 G3 FG2 B1 FG2 B2 FG2  G FG2/B FG2 
FG5 P8 
Local authority maintained 
Non-faith 
Hereford 
17.6 547 
G1 FG5 
“Lizzy” 
G2 FG5 G3 FG5 
G4 FG5 
“Alison” 
B1 FG5 
“Tom” 
B2 FG5 
“Gavin” 
G FG5/B FG5 
FG7 
P10 
Community school 
Non-faith 
Cornwall 
10 80 
G1 G2 G3 B1 B2 B3 
G FG7/B FG7 
“Jack” 
FG8 
G1 FG8 
“Tilda” 
G2 FG8 G3 FG8 B1 FG8 
B2 FG8 
“Toby” 
 G FG8/B FG8 
FG9 P11 Voluntary aided 
Roman Catholic 
Stockport 
45.6 128 
G1 FG9 G2 FG9 B1 FG9 B2 FG9 B3 FG9 B4 FG9 
G FG9/B FG9 
“Dan” “Jessica” 
FG10 P11 G1 FG10 G2 FG10 B1 FG10 
B2 FG10 
“Ben” 
B3 FG10 
“Mike” 
B4 FG10 G FG10/B FG10 
FG11 P13 
Independent 
Non-faith 
Suffolk 
- 196 G1 FG11 G2 FG11 G3 FG11 B1 FG11 B2 FG11 B3 FG11 G FG11/B FG11 
FG12 P2 
Independent 
Catholic 
London 
- 124 G1 FG12 G2 FG12 G3 FG12 G4 FG12 B1 FG12 B2 GF12 G FG12/B FG12 
FG13 P14 
Community 
Non-faith 
Cumbria 
44 205 G1 FG13 G2 FG13 
B1 FG13 
“Tod” 
B2 FG13 
“Ian” 
B3 FG13 B4 FG13 G FG13/B FG13 
FG14 P15 
 
Community 
Non-faith 
Staffordshire 
46.7 229 
G1 FG14 
“May” 
G2 FG14 G3 FG14 B1 FG14 B2 FG14 B3 FG14 G FG14/B FG14 
FG15 G1 FG15 G2 FG15 G3 FG15 B1 FG15 B2 FG15 B3 FG15 G FG15/B FG15 
FG16 P12 
Community 
Non-faith 
Birmingham 
22.9 362 
G1 FG16 
“Sonam” 
G2 FG16 G3 FG16 G4 FG16 
B1 FG16 
“Sanjay” 
B2 FG16 G FG16/B FG16 
FG17 P16 
Community 
Non-faith 
Gloucester 
20.5 297 G1 FG17 
G2 FG17 
“Kate” 
G3 FG17 
“Sarah” 
B1 FG17 
“Kevin” 
B2 FG17 
B3 FG17 
“Matt” 
G FG17/B FG17 
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Table 2.  Pupils’ indirect and direct reference to virtue 
 
Theme Explanation of Theme Virtue Evidence (1) Evidence (2) 
1 
Refer to many virtues, directly 
and indirectly 
Virtue Directly Indirectly, selected examples 
Honesty 
Sense of humour 
Reliability 
Love 
Trustworthiness 
Generosity 
Helpfulness 
Possession of self-control 
Kindness 
Care 
Perseverance/determination 
Humility/modesty 
Thoughtfulness 
Creativity 
Loyalty 
Braveness/courage 
Empathy 
Consideration 
 
Perspective 
Share 
Respect 
Patience 
Gratitude 
Fair 
Forgiveness 
Teamwork 
Commitment 
Intelligence 
Encouragement/support 
Vitality 
Politeness 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
√ 
Never hides anything from me; never lie to you 
Funny; jokes a lot; hilarious 
Do never tell a secret 
 
Don’t talk about you behind your back; don’t betray you; can tell anything 
 
Give you advice 
 
 
Cares about you; look after you; listens to your feelings; comfort you 
Kept on going; never give up; always battling to be the best; tenacious 
Doesn’t boast or show off; teachers admit not good at everything 
 
 
Always by your side; always there for you; on your side 
Sticking up for people 
Understand what you’re feeling 
Thinks of others; understanding of other people, like notice if somebody’s upset 
Care about how you’re feeling; think about you…not just themselves 
See things from other people’s point of view 
e.g. lunch, bricks 
 
 
Say thank you a lot 
Gives everyone a chance to play with her; treat pupils evenly; wouldn’t be biased 
 
Cooperative  
Put a lot of effort into things for people; always works hard 
Someone who knows stuff; smart; knowledgeable  
Believe in pupils; supports you in everything you do 
They’ve got a lot of energy 
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Analysis 
 
Transcripts from the sessions were initially coded for direct and indirect references to virtue (Table 
2).  This was done using a grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), whereby the third 
author open-coded (Holton, 2007) the transcriptions line-by-line for references to virtue.  This 
revealed unexpectedly sophisticated descriptions of virtue, especially in the discussions of good 
friends, and led the researchers to explore the idea of good peer friendships between children 
aged nine and ten.  The third author subsequently re-coded the data using the Aristotelian 
categories of pleasure, utility, and virtue-based friendships.  At this stage, further theoretical work 
was undertaken (by the second author) to clarify the nature, varieties, and character prerequisites 
of friendship.  On the basis of this theoretical work, the data were re-coded again, focussing on the 
three aspects of moral virtue required for eudaimonic friendship.  The final stages of coding were 
completed in the first instance by the third author and then again by the first author, before the 
two coders compared, discussed and refined the basis on which coding decisions were made in 
order to achieve inter-coder reliability.  Findings are based on the transcript segments addressing 
friendship and participants’ assessments of their own goodness.   
The presentation of these findings will be organized around the research questions: Do 
pre-adolescent children recognize virtues of character as important to friendship quality?  Do they 
aspire to be friends who possess and exhibit the attributes of virtue essential to eudaimonic 
friendship or already possess these attributes and have eudaimonic friendships?  The presentation 
of findings bearing on the latter question will match the sequence of attributes identified in 
section 2.   
  
Do Pre-adolescent Children Recognize Virtues of Character as Important to Friendship Quality?  
 
Direct and indirect references to a wide range of virtues occurred frequently throughout the 
sessions (Table 2), as well as detailed accounts of childhood situations in which the virtues of 
friends were objects of concern.  We interpreted this as evidence that many of the children 
recognised a variety of moral virtues as desirable in friends, and (as discussed in the sub-section 
below) that they also aspired to or exhibited such virtues themselves.  A high degree of concern 
and care for each other was also observed during the actual focus groups.  Friendships were 
mostly discussed in warm and caring ways and often with reference to shared activities that are 
routine for children of this age, such as completing or handing in homework, performing in and 
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organising school assemblies, selecting partners in Physical Education lessons, and lunch time 
games such as football.  
In describing qualities of a good friend, the language of virtue seemed to come naturally to 
many of the children.  They said, for example, that a good friend was brave, loyal, helpful, honest, 
reliable, and so on.  Other children who did not refer to virtues by name described good friends in 
ways that implied virtues.  For example, loyalty was referred to indirectly through such phrases as, 
“always by your side” (B1FG1; FG2), “always there for you” (G3FG5; B1FG13; FG7), and “on your 
side” (G3FG16).  Empathy was implicit in references to a friend understanding what one is feeling.  
Fairness was indirectly referred to through such phrases as, “gives everyone a chance to play with 
her”’ (BFG9) or “wouldn’t be biased” (B3FG1).  Trustworthiness was indicated through statements 
that friends “don’t talk about you behind your back” (G1FG1), “don’t betray you” (GFG5), or “can 
tell you anything” (G1FG13).  Both direct and indirect references to virtue expressed appreciation 
of virtuous acts of friendship and appreciation of friends based on their good character.    
 The children participating in the sessions said a friend is “always fair” if they “include 
everyone in games” (G3FG15), and a good friend “wouldn’t be biased and go on the other 
person’s side [but would] listen to two sides of the story” if there was an argument, because 
people are “equal” (B3FG1).  Fairness was also a trait that the children admired in their own 
characters, or aspired to: “I always try to be fair… I try to not think about how I feel and try and 
see things from other people’s point of view. Like, I’m not the only one that’s upset” (G2FG14).  
One example given for fairness involved a talent show when, “everyone got something to sort 
out,” e.g. the decorations or speaking to teachers about being judges (G2FG16).  Being honest and 
not deceiving or manipulating each other were also identified as aspects of basic moral respect 
required of friends.  Mike7 said of friends, for example, that “they wouldn’t cover up the truth.  
Say they did something wrong, [they] wouldn’t blame it on you, [they’d] be honest and say ‘yeah it 
was my fault’, and say sorry.”  Sanjay also explained that if “one of your friends accidentally steals 
something that’s yours [they would] tell [you], instead of [you] being upset.”  Despite worries that 
“you might lose them as a friend” (because of taking the object in the first place), a good friend 
would recognise that the best solution is to be honest and admit the mistake (“if you do tell them 
they’ll just be happy”).  
 Something children said they expect of friends is that they would not cheat: “if someone 
cheated for their house8 to win you wouldn’t be good friends, even if he cheated for his house to 
win the results” (B3FG17).  In addition to perceiving cheating as less than admirable, they 
expressed the view that a friend would not lead them to act in ways which get them in trouble.  
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For example, Gavin told us that “sometimes there’s one bad thing about your friend, because 
friends can land you into trouble if they make the wrong move and be a little bit silly.”  Similarly, 
Sarah felt a good friend was “someone that won’t get you in to trouble,” and a friend was 
“someone that makes you feel comfortable and safe around them.”  Neither would a good friend 
apply excessive pressure to get his own way: “if [they] didn’t really want to play a game, not like 
forcing them to play it just ‘cause you want to play it” (Toby). 
Keeping secrets and helping each other “pull through” in the face of difficulties stood out 
as the foci of the children’s more sensitive friendship observations.  The disclosure or guarding of 
sensitive information was often invoked as a marker of the quality of a friendship, especially as a 
measure of being valued by a friend and in determining trustworthiness or how far the friends 
could trust each other.  It takes time for trust to develop between friends, Jack explained through 
a story about an ant: “‘I trust you to look after this tiny ant’, and if they can do that then you can 
move on to the bigger secrets.”  One child explained that a secret “would just be between you and 
your friend” (G3FG1), while another said “you can tell me stuff and I won’t tell anybody else if you 
don’t ask me to” (BFG13), “because if you told them something that you don’t want anyone else 
to know and they go blurting it out you get really upset” (FG2).            
 Supportiveness in helping one “pull through” difficulties was also invoked as a broad 
marker of the quality of friendships, and would commonly be associated with such attributes as 
compassion, generosity, and valuing people for themselves. The provision of support between 
friends was described as entailing practical and emotional help, in such terms as, “‘they’ll help you 
to cheer up” (G3FG5), “they care about your feelings” (G2FG17), “when times are tough, helps you 
to pull through” (B2FG10), and [a friend is] “someone to talk to if you’re feeling sad” (B2FG15).  
Children looked to friends to “…always [be] there for [them] when [they were] upset” (B1FG13), 
and to be “there when [they] need a support or a shoulder to cry on” (G2FG10).  Children said they 
would help friends in these ways, and expect friends to offer such support, when facing difficult 
events such as injuring themselves, being in hospital, or experiencing the death of a pet or family 
member.  For example, Ben claimed that if “your grandma is dead or something like that, they’ll 
help you pull through,” while May explained that “if something bad happened to your family, [a 
good friend] would come over to you if you are upset and ask you why, and [they] would say ‘I am 
sorry for that,’ erm, maybe give you a hug, and then talk through it, because it always feels better 
when you talk to someone about your problems.” 
Best or close friends were most likely to help each other pull through since “best friends 
are the ones that are always there for you” (GFG5) and “if you have a really, really strong 
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friendship with someone, they’re always there if you need them” (G2FG10).  Many different kinds 
of circumstances stimulated the need and expectation for friends to help each other pull through, 
and this was achieved in multiple ways, such as by cheering each other up, telling jokes, sticking up 
for each other (e.g. “If somebody bullies you they stick up for you and make things good” (B1FG1), 
helping each other in arguments, and handing in homework.  Lizzy referred to an example from 
the day before, recounting that “…my friend was sad yesterday because her dog is too weak, and I 
said ‘he’ll be alright,’ sort of thing like that,” while in a different group, Sonam explained that “a 
few days ago a friend […] was worried about something, so at lunch [they] sat down and chatted 
and… she feels a bit better now.”   
There were references to valuing friends for their non-moral qualities and for instrumental 
reasons, though there were far fewer such references than expected.  Some children indicated 
that they only wanted to be with someone who was fun or funny, not sad, moody or boring.  For 
example, Jessica said that happiness was important: “…so, like, if someone’s sad or angry then 
there’s no point being their friend because they … wouldn’t show that they liked you if they 
weren’t happy when you were there.”   Similarly, Dan said that what was needed in a friend was “a 
sense of humour – so not always like dull and they don’t have a laugh or anything.”  Other 
examples included children who saw friends as sources of practical assistance at school (e.g., 
Sanjay: “they help you with your work if you don’t have any ideas”) or as companions so they 
wouldn’t be alone.  Such concern with pleasure and instrumental valuing of friends was evident in 
some children, but on the whole this was overshadowed by references to virtues of character.  
 
Do Pre-adolescent Children Possess or Aspire to the Virtues Essential to Eudaimonic Friendship? 
 
Basic moral respect for others as self-determining persons. 
 
Basic moral respect was repeatedly exhibited by the children in how they related to each other 
within the focus groups and in their accounts of friendship.  Friends show each other respect by 
“listen[ing] to each other” (BFG14); they “don’t sort of talk when they’re talking” (G2FG8).  They 
also understand that “people make mistakes and just get on with them” (B2FG14).  Many 
recognised that friends should consider each other’s opinions and respect what others have to 
say.  So, for example, “if you’re playing a game and they wanted to change, listen to what they 
have to say cause it might be a good idea… if you don’t want to do that that’s fine, but it’s good to 
just listen” (G3FG8).  If someone does say something “you don’t like, don’t go off in a big strop; say 
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‘I don’t really like that idea, can we do another idea”’ (G2FG8).  By providing these examples, the 
children acknowledged the importance of respecting others’ ideas and preferences, and expressed 
aspirations to show such respect in practice, however limited their ability to do that in practice 
might be.   The examples above concerning fairness, cheating, and pressuring provide similar 
evidence of sensitivity to aspects of basic moral respect, and aspiration to be a person who 
respects others in those ways.  
 Another indication that children aspire to a form of basic moral respect for each other is 
that they say friends “take time to learn about [each other’s] personality” (GFG8).  They 
recognised that “different people have different qualities” (G2FG10), and that “everyone’s 
different in their own way” (G1FG17); whereas “some people might [exhibit] forgiveness, some 
people might not” (G2FG10).  Alison told us that even if “the outside appearance of a person is 
really dull and boring, [you might] open it up and it’s a really good book.” The expression of 
friendly curiosity about each other may qualify as an aspect of respect and good will in ongoing 
social contact.  It is in any case a prerequisite for the development of friendships based on valuing 
a friend for him or herself.  
 
Appreciating a friend’s good qualities.  
 
The children in this study seemed to recognise and appreciate attributes of good character in their 
friends.  They identified admirable character attributes as important and discussed them in ways 
that demonstrated substantial and nuanced understanding of relevant criteria for judging who 
does and does not possess them.  Many distinguished a good or true friend from a poor or false 
one and expressed this in relation to virtue, both directly and indirectly (Table 2), saying that a 
friend who could not be trusted (or relied upon) would not be a “proper friend,” but would be a 
“fake friend” (G2FG10).  Many of the children easily described good qualities that they 
appreciated in their friends.  Among these were qualities such as  caring (“about your feelings” 
(multiple), kindness (“he’s always kind to others and always helps them” [B2FG8]; “make[s] you 
laugh to make you feel good” [B1FG5]), honesty (“they don’t lie to you and they’re always honest” 
[B2FG13]), thoughtfulness (e.g. with regards to playtime games friends didn’t enjoy, “they might 
think about doing something else to make you feel included” [B4FG13]), loyalty  (“doesn’t act 
against you even when everyone else does” [G2FG2]), gratitude (“if you … do something for them, 
they are grateful” [G1FG14]), sharing (“if you had more bricks, like 14, and they had 10, you can 
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split the four… so you’ll both have 12” [B3FG17]), and empathy (“empathy, put yourself in place of 
me” [GFG12]).  
 Trustworthiness was an important good in the character of a friend and was discussed 
constantly in reference to their own friends: “well I’ve got friends and they’re trustworthy, and I 
put my trust in them daily” (G3FG14).  It was also discussed hypothetically: “you’ve got to be able 
to trust them, and they’ve got to be able to trust you” (G1FG10); “if you ask someone to do 
something, you trust them to do it, so if they don’t do it, you kind of lose trust with them, so you 
don’t trust them anymore” (B1FG17): and “if they told loads of lies then they’d kind of lose their 
trust with the friend, which isn’t a good sign of friendship” (GFG9).  
Modesty and humility were admired both hypothetically and as attributes of specific 
friends: “it’s basically when you’re modest... So you know what arrogant is? … Modesty is the 
opposite of that.  So that’s what humble is” (BFG12).  A lack of modesty was criticised by Tod and 
Ian “because if you always say ‘I’m good at this, I’m good at that’ or ‘I’m better than you at that,’ 
then it’s boasting,” and so friends would “just give up on you” and “then they’re not your friend 
anymore.” 
 Appreciative regard for friends’ good qualities was also accompanied by discussions of the 
children’s own qualities and aspirations to be worthy friends. For example, some pupils said that 
they needed to “work on [taking] more time to think of others instead of doing things that [they] 
want to do” (May/G1FG14); that they “should improve on [standing up for friends] a bit” 
(G1FG12); and that they should involve old friends more (“I need to spend more time with my 
friend… because I used to play with him all the time, but ever since I’ve had new friends and 
moved onto the street I’m leaving him out” [G3FG15]). These examples reflect how children 
perceive their own characters in the context of their friendships, and demonstrate an 
understanding of relevant virtues and aspirations to practice and exhibit them.  Many of the 
children expressed a dedication to their friends’ happiness and understanding that this required 
them to monitor or improve their own characters.  They thereby expressed an aspiration to 
possess virtues associated with eudaimonic friendship.  
 
Willingness to act for the good of another for the other’s sake.     
 
Being willing to act for the good of another for the other’s sake, or expecting this of a friend, was a 
recurrent theme in the focus group sessions.  Sometimes this was understood to require special 
efforts and attempts to improve oneself as a person.  Expressions of concern for friends often 
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revealed a surprising degree of nuance, sensitivity and tact, involving the protection of each 
other’s feelings and the exercise of good sense.  Tilda told us that good friends needed sometimes 
to be “truthful, but untruthful in a way” and went on to explain that “if they ask you, like, ‘Do you 
like my clothing?’, you can’t just go, ‘No, I hate it,’ but should instead say ‘Yeah, I think it really 
suits you but I don’t think I would ever wear it.’”  Tilda went on to say, “If you, er, invited your 
friend round to your house and you had like a dog, you’d say, ‘Oh do you like my German 
Shepherd, Sally?’ [But if say] in the past they’ve [the friend] said they’ve had bad encounters with 
German Shepherds, instead of saying like, ‘No they attack me’, [they would] be friendly.”  Tactfully 
fielding questions from friends in a “truthful but untruthful” way involved mundane matters such 
as “ugly” pencil cases and more serious considerations such as friends asking if they’re “fat” 
(BFG12).  
 These kinds of discussions of balancing compassion and honesty were frequently referred 
to as important to being a good friend and they provide evidence of concern to act for the other 
person’s sake.  The children engaged in these discussions displayed thoughtfulness about how to 
exhibit different virtues in challenging situations, often recognizing that making an effort on 
someone else’s behalf was part and parcel of friendship.  Some children said that they supported 
each other in assemblies (“I came in even though I was sick; I came for her because I knew I 
wouldn’t let her down” [G4FG12]), that they cared for friends when they were upset and stood up 
for them (“I stand up for my friends because I don’t like when people be mean to [them]” 
[B2FG12]); that they encouraged each other during their SATs (test taken in year six, when pupils 
are around the age of ten) (G2FG16), and generally showed that sensitivity to  a friend’s needs is 
important: “if you’re always thinking about yourself… you wouldn’t have a friend if you always did 
that, like ‘me, me, me,’” and nobody “would want a friend that… doesn’t think of you and thinks of 
themselves” (G1FG14). 
Supporting a friend could be complicated when opinions differed or situations provoked 
jealousy or envy, such as when a friend gets a reward the other would like.  But, still, a friend 
should “be happy for you [if] you got an opportunity that they didn’t” (G2FG14) and remain loyal, 
“if you’ve got something maybe that your friend would want” (G1FG14).  “A proper friend would 
be someone who, say if you liked something different that they didn’t particularly like, they don’t 
change their opinion about you… they just stay friends with you, because you’re your own person” 
(G1FG8).  How do children apply such insights and know what to say and do?  The children in one 
session explained that “you have to look at their face and work out what they’re feeling,” or 
“sometimes it’s body language” (GFG5).  
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Limitations 
 
A limitation of relying on teachers to select students for the study is that researchers could never 
be sure how truly representative the samples within each school were. The expectation that 
teachers would choose only six pupils for each session will have made this task difficult for them, 
but making sessions larger was not feasible.  It is possible that a more representative sampling of 
students would have revealed a lower incidence of concern with moral aspects of friendship 
quality and evidence of capacity for true friendship. 
Another limitation of the study is that the researchers’ framing of the purpose of the focus 
groups (“how schools can help children be good people”) and dynamics of group process with 
researchers present may have induced a higher incidence of references to virtues and displays of 
virtuous aspiration.  A study design in which children are prompted to discuss friendship quality 
without adults present might reveal a lower incidence of concern with moral aspects of friendship 
or – perhaps just as likely (see Dunn, 2006) – a higher incidence of negative moral assessments of 
specific peers.  Although a skewing of responses toward what subjects perceive as socially 
desirable could be anticipated, there was no cuing of any of the specific attributes the children 
identified as desirable in friends and aspired to themselves.  That is, the children were cued that 
“goodness” was of interest to the researchers, but there was no cuing of what would count as 
good.  So while a social desirability bias is likely, the children’s focus on specific attributes may 
nevertheless be a significant reflection of their own experience of peer friendships.   
A third limitation of the study’s methods is that they may underestimate children’s 
capacity for eudaimonic friendship, if their social competence outstrips their descriptive 
capacities.9  Children even younger than the nine- and ten-year-olds in this study may well be 
capable of friendships high in eudaimonic quality.  Because the qualities of their friendships and 
friendship preferences may be largely inaccessible to interview and focus group methods, future 
studies should include observational methods where feasible.   
Finally, this study offers no insight into the impact of early institutional experiences that 
bring young children together with more peers than they might otherwise encounter, while also 
structuring much of the time they spend together.  
 
V. DISCUSSION 
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Are children capable of true friendship?  Do they value and possess the attributes of 
character essential to friendships high in eudaimonic quality?  We have found no basis for the 
pessimistic view that real friendship does not emerge until adolescence, and we see strong 
evidence in this study of children valuing and supporting each other in ways characteristic of 
eudaimonic friendship.  We posited that eudaimonistic friendship is good for people, and 
hypothesized that it would align with and explain judgments about who is and is not a good friend.  
A peer who shows concern for one’s wellbeing and supports the fulfillment of one’s potential and 
associated satisfaction of one’s basic psychological needs is much more likely to be identified as a 
good friend than one who does not.  This hypothesis is substantially confirmed by the present 
study: children value friendships that respect self-determination and support personal growth, 
success in worthy endeavors, and wider relational fulfillment.   
Children in the sessions we conducted discussed examples of real and “fake” friends from 
their own experience, offering meaningful criteria for the possession of relevant virtues.  This 
suggests that children aged 9 to 10 have enough discernment of who is good in specific ways, and 
who is not, in order to form eudaimonic friendships.  It also suggests variability in how consistently 
children of this age display basic moral respect for each other, and that some do so with enough 
regularity to have eudaimonic friendships.  We also saw substantial evidence that children of this 
age attach importance to friends valuing each other for themselves and being willing to act 
unselfishly for each other’s sake.   In sum, there is significant evidence that children are capable of 
and value eudaimonic friendship, much as adults do, even if their respective spheres of shared 
activity are very different. 
As expected, this study did offer insight into children’s moral character, and it revealed a 
command of the language of virtue that was surprising, given recent discussions of the 
disappearance of such language from public discourse (Kesebir and Kesebir, 2012).  In the context 
of prior research on children’s friendships, the session transcripts also indicate a significant and 
surprisingly sophisticated understanding of interpersonal respect, appreciation of good moral 
attributes in others, aspiration to become a better person by doing what is characteristic of good 
friends, and commitment to the good of others for their own sake.  Although it is impossible to 
judge on this basis how consistently this understanding and aspiration is manifested in admirable 
conduct, the evidence of genuine moral motivation is strong.  We interpret the data as indicating 
the possession of moral motivation focused on the well-being of peer friends, as a virtue-theoretic 
understanding of moral motivation would require (Curren, 2015b), and motivation to engage in 
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self-directed activities of friendship that would be consistent with and develop the requisite 
virtues. 
 What was less expected initially was the extent to which the study would also reveal 
evidence that pre-adolescent children care about the ethical qualities of peers as an aspect of 
friendship quality.  This suggests that some children’s understanding of good friendship coincides 
substantially with eudaimonic friendship as we have defined it, and that they do have eudaimonic 
friendships.  The evidence that children care about their friends’ moral character and experience 
variability with respect to character within their circle of peers also suggests that, in contexts 
similar to those sampled in our study, many children will gravitate to others whose own moral 
attributes and perceptions will provide a context for peer-coaching favourable to becoming a 
better friend and better person.  This should not be surprising.  However limited children’s ability 
to conceptualize virtues and qualities of friendship may be, they have needs whose frustration is 
painful.  It is predictable that, given the choice, they would gravitate to peers who are more 
supportive of their relational, autonomy, and competence needs, and aspire to be worthy of their 
friendship.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This study is the first to investigate the role of ethical qualities in children’s friendship assessments 
and aspirations, and it suggests that at least some children do understand many of the same 
virtues of friendship adults would identify, value them, aspire to them, and may exhibit them in 
the context of friendships with peers.  We conclude that the ideal of eudaimonic friendship is 
consistent with children’s understanding of good friendship, and that the satisfaction of 
psychological needs invoked in studies of adult friendship quality may also substantially explain 
children’s judgments of friendship quality. The ethical aspects of friendship quality warrant further 
investigation.   
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1 Kohlberg was notoriously opposed to conceptualizing moral development in terms of virtue, but his cognitive stage 
theory of moral development implies that pre-adolescent children are at best committed to upholding social 
conventions.  By contrast, virtue involves responsiveness to the value of things, and friends typically want to be valued 
for themselves or their inherent qualities. 
 
2 The only other basis for friendship Aristotle identifies is utility, or a person’s usefulness in obtaining some desired 
object or assistance.  
 
3 We owe this important observation to an anonymous referee. 
 
4 On the general theme of there being forms of goodness that are natural in the sense of being requirements for 
human flourishing or attaining satisfying goods, see Foot (2001).  On the significance of being supplied with a 
vocabulary of virtue and “the good” more generally, see Annas (2011: 16-25); Arthur (2010: 79-84). 
 
5 Identifying the conditions in which peer-mediated habituation might efficiently promote moral learning, and not 
undermine it, is beyond the scope of this inquiry, though it is fair to assume that independent moral socialization and 
the availability of potential friends who already care about being good are important, and that the accessibility of 
vocabularies and exemplars of goodness is helpful in enabling children to think through their experiences of friendship 
productively.  Studies of children’s peer relationships bear out the fact that their friendships can be both very positive 
and quite problematic.   
6 All but one of these sessions was conducted by the first author. 
 
7 Pseudonyms are used throughout. See Table 1.    
 
8 The term “house” refers to a grouping of children within a school for purposes of registration, competition as “house 
teams” in sporting events, and the like. 
 
9 We owe this important observation to an anonymous referee. 
